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FOR A UNIFORM SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY
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Rachel Santoro*
INTRODUCTION
Jane was an employee at a paper manufacturing plant for seven years.
For the first six and a half years of her employment, Jane had always
received satisfactory reviews from her plant supervisor John, although
these reviews documented her occasional tardiness and one disciplinary
action for a safety violation. However, Jane’s performance was always
rated satisfactory overall, and John did not consider the infractions grounds
for termination.
Dave replaced John as plant supervisor in a management overhaul at
the plant six months ago. Other company employees had overheard Dave
making comments that working in a manufacturing plant is a “man’s job”
and a plant is “no place for women” because they are not “strong enough or
tough enough to get the job done right.” Other plant workers described
Dave as generally curt and abrupt with his female employees, while being
easygoing and friendly when interacting with his male employees. Jane
has likened Dave’s management style to an “old boy’s club.” During
Jane’s annual evaluation one month ago, Dave evaluated Jane’s work
performance as unsatisfactory in a majority of the evaluation criteria in
which she had always received positive marks. Jane took issue with this
evaluation and expressed her objections to Dave during their review
meeting. Dave responded that he thought her petite size and strength made
performing laborious tasks at the plant difficult, and suggested that she find
work more appropriate for “workers like her.”
The plant was recently faced with financial difficulties and had to
downsize; as a result, it fired Jane. A human resources manager located at
the employer’s corporate headquarters in a different city made termination
* J.D., 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2006, Northeastern
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decisions based upon an investigation that included a review of personnel
files and supervisor recommendations. Performance evaluations and
supervisor recommendations were heavily weighed in termination
decisions, but past disciplinary actions and other performance related
factors were considered as well. Although the human resources manager
who terminated Jane never met her and did not harbor discriminatory
animus towards women, at least part of the decision was based on Dave’s
input. Should the paper manufacturing plant be held liable for terminating
Jane because of her immediate supervisor’s discriminatory animus towards
women?
The Supreme Court was scheduled to hear arguments on a similar
issue in EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles 1 in April
2006. The question was presented as: “Under what circumstances is an
employer liable under federal anti-discrimination laws based on a
subordinate’s discriminatory animus, where the person(s) who actually
made the adverse employment decision admittedly harbored no
discriminatory motive toward the impacted employee.” 2 Several circuit
courts of appeals have adopted variations of the “cat’s paw” 3 theory to
answer similar questions and impute liability to the employer for a
subordinate supervisor’s discriminatory treatment of a statutorily protected
employee. The “cat’s paw” theory imputes liability to an employer when a
biased employee uses his or her employer as the formal mechanism through
which to fire an employee for discriminatory reasons. 4 It is also referred to
as “subordinate bias” theory. The circuit courts of appeals are split along
three general levels of subordinate bias influence that is necessary to
impute liability to the employer in cases where subordinate supervisor bias
influences employment actions: (1) “principally responsible” 5 ; (2) “any
influence” 6 ; and (3) “causal connection.” 7 Days before the Supreme Court
was scheduled to hear arguments for BCI, the case was dismissed, 8 and this
1. 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006).
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 549
U.S. 1105 (2007) (No. 06-341), 2006 WL 2582502.
3. Judge Posner first dubbed the subordinate bias theory of liability as the “cat’s paw”
in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). The doctrine derives its name
from a fable titled “The Monkey and the Cat” by Jean LaFontaine. In the story, a cunning
monkey persuades a cat to pull chestnuts out of a hot fire for the two animals to eat. While
the cat pulls the chestnuts and burns his paws, the monkey eats all of the chestnuts himself
and deserts the cat.
4. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the nature of a cat’s paw case).
5. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir. 2004).
6. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405.
7. BCI, 450 F.3d at 487-88.
8. The parties settled and requested a dismissal. See BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
L.A. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (dismissing writ of certiorari).
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important split remains unaddressed. 9
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should resolve this
important employment discrimination circuit split. Part I of this Comment
summarizes the various circuits’ subordinate bias liability approaches in
detail and identifies why one consistent standard is necessary. Part II
contends that subordinate bias theory has support in federal antidiscrimination statutory frameworks. Part III explains why the Tenth
Circuit’s “causal connection” is the closest to an appropriate standard and
identifies areas for improvement if it were to become the uniform standard.
Finally, Part IV addresses the need for a definitive approach to the
“independent investigation” requirement articulated in all of the
subordinate bias liability approaches.
I.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Shager v. Upjohn Co. is the original “cat’s paw” case. In an opinion
written by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that “any influence” of a
biased supervisor is enough to impute liability for discrimination to an
employer. 10 In Shager, a middle-aged fertilizer salesman alleged that he
was terminated from his position because of his younger, age-biased
supervisor. 11 The employee claimed that his supervisor asked him how he
felt about being supervised by a younger person, assigned him a more
challenging sales territory, and treated him poorly compared to a younger
salesman who held the same employment position. 12 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the summary judgment order to defendants, and extended the
doctrine of respondeat superior 13 to the employment discrimination
context. The court held that when a biased subordinate deliberately acts to
create an unfavorable employment situation for an employee, the employer
for which the biased subordinate is an agent should be held liable for

9. The Supreme Court had two more opportunities to review subordinate liability bias,
but declined both. See Sawicki v. Morgan State Univ., 170 Fed. App’x. 271 (4th Cir. 2006),
cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 2095 (2007); Ray v. CSX Transp., Inc., 189 Fed. App’x 154 (4th Cir.
2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1053.
10. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405.
11. Id. at 401.
12. Id. at 400.
13. The common law tort principle of respondent superior was adopted in the
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 (2006) for employees acting within the scope of their
employment. See Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 817 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“[T]he plaintiff must show that the employee’s tort was in attempted (though often
misguided) furtherance of the employer’s business . . . .”). The Shager court noted that the
common law rule is usually carried over to statutory torts because statutes often do not
cover all the issues necessary to construct a complete tort liability regime. Shager, 913 F.2d
at 404.
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disparate treatment. 14 Most circuits have adopted some variation of the
“any influence” standard formulated by the Shager court, although the
courts have differed over the level of influence the biased subordinate must
exert over the employment action in order for the employer to be held
liable. 15
In stark contrast to the broad “any influence” approach, the Fourth
Circuit has held that a biased subordinate must be “principally responsible”
for a termination based on disparate treatment of a protected employee in
order to be held liable for employment discrimination. 16 In Hill v.
Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., a fifty-seven-year-old female employee
alleged that she was terminated from her mechanic’s job at Lockheed
Martin due to age and sex discrimination and in retaliation for her
The mechanic was
complaints about the alleged discrimination. 17
terminated after a series of written reprimands for violations of quality and
safety standards. 18 Although she admitted that the reprimands were for
valid violations, she contended that a safety inspector at her military jobsite
reported two of these violations because he harbored discriminatory animus
for her, evidenced by the inspector’s disparaging remarks about her age and
gender. 19 Because the two reports the inspector made resulted in the
mechanic’s second and third reprimands, she alleged her termination was
because of the inspector’s discrimination. 20 The court declined to adopt the
approach of the Seventh Circuit and affirmed summary judgment to
Lockheed, declaring that even if the biased subordinate had played a
significant role or had a substantial influence on the adverse employment
action, it was not sufficient to hold the employer liable. 21 The Fourth
Circuit’s “principally responsible” test has been widely criticized and not
followed by any other circuit court of appeals. 22
14. Shager, 913 F.2d at 404.
15. See Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 819-20; Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th
Cir. 2007); BCI, 450 F.3d at 487. For a detailed discussion of the standards developed in
these cases, see Genova & Vernoia, infra note 28, at 20.
16. Hill, 354 F.3d at 281-82.
17. Id. at 282.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 283.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 290-91.
22. See, e.g., BCI, 450 F.3d at 487 (“The Fourth Circuit’s strict approach makes too
much of the phrase ‘actual decisionmaker’ . . . [and] also undermines the deterrent effect of
subordinate bias claims, allowing employers to escape liability even when a subordinate’s
discrimination is the sole cause of an adverse employment action, on the theory that the
subordinate did not exercise complete control over the decisionmaker.”); Poland, 494 F.3d
at 1182 (“No doubt an employer is liable for the discriminatory acts of a subordinate in
cases where the biased subordinate is, as a practical matter, the actual decisionmaker. But
liability should not be limited to those cases only.”); Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584
(7th Cir. 2004) (“We are mindful [of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Hill] . . . . That is not
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a “causal connection” standard
that is positioned intermediately between the “any influence” and
“principally responsible” standards previously discussed. In BCI, a
Hispanic District Sales Manager reported an African-American
merchandiser to human resources for insubordination because the
merchandiser failed to report to work after telling his supervisor that he
would not make it in. 23 The District Sales Manager had a history of
making disparaging comments about African-American employees and
treating them less fairly than other employees under similar
When the District Sales Manager reported the
circumstances. 24
merchandiser to a human resources manager, she reviewed his personnel
record and made the decision to terminate him. 25 The human resources
manager harbored no discriminatory views against the merchandiser—in
fact, she didn’t even know he was African-American. 26 The merchandiser
filed suit against BCI after he was terminated, alleging racial
discrimination. 27
Adopting a middle-ground approach, 28 the Tenth Circuit held in this
case that a plaintiff must demonstrate a “causal connection” between his or
her biased supervisor and the adverse employment action in order to prevail
on the merits of a subordinate bias claim. 29 The court further held that an
employer could be held liable for the subordinate’s discriminatory bias if
the plaintiff established that the biased supervisor’s report to the actual
decision maker was the real reason for termination, that the other reasons
given were pretextual, and that the employer did not undertake a
sufficiently independent investigation of the complaint. 30
The inconsistency of these three general approaches to subordinate
bias liability has led to more questions than answers for employers.
Depending on the jurisdiction in which these disputes are litigated,
employers currently have varying levels of responsibility to ensure
liability-free employment actions. For instance, an employer under the
Fourth Circuit’s standard could insulate itself from liability by having all
adverse employment decisions performed by a committee, essentially
creating a “revolving door” where the committee could terminate an
the view of this court.”).
23. BCI, 450 F.3d at 480.
24. See id. at 482 (describing allegations of mistreatment lodged by Sales Manager at
Hispanic employees).
25. Id. at 481-82.
26. Id. at 481.
27. Id. at 482.
28. Anjelo J. Genova & Francis J. Vernoia, Practical Considerations from Recent
Development in Employment Law. 759 Prac. L. Inst./Litig. 9, 21 (2007).
29. BCI, 450 F.3d at 487.
30. Id. at 488.
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employee for any discriminatory reason as long as the affected employee
was questioned. 31 In stark contrast, an employer defending against a
lawsuit in the Seventh Circuit is faced with a difficult situation: a single
complaint or allegation by a biased supervisor could impute liability to the
employer if an adverse employment action is taken in relation to the
complaint, despite good faith policies and compliance with antidiscrimination laws. 32 Somewhere in the middle of these contrasting
approaches, an employer under the Tenth Circuit’s standard may know that
some type of independent investigation policy is necessary to protect
against subordinate bias liability, but just who should investigate and how
the investigation should proceed is unclear. 33 These differing approaches
not only leave employers uncertain about what type of procedural
mechanisms to instate for adverse employment actions, but they also
deprive affected employees of clear recourse for discriminatory actions and
undermine the objectives of anti-discrimination legislation.
II.

THE CAT’S PAW THEORY OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY FURTHERS THE
OBJECTIVES OF STATUTORY ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AND AGENCY
PRINCIPLES

Although the threshold of employer responsibility for discriminating
employees with no actual decision-making authority varies among the
different approaches, all agree that liability can be imputed to the employer.
This agreement to impose liability on an employer for a biased
subordinate’s act or influence is firmly grounded in federal antidiscrimination statutes and statutory principles of agency. 34
Adopting agency principles in the employment context furthers many
purposes. First, holding employers responsible for the actions of their

31. Tim Davis, Beyond the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for Adopting a “Substantially
Influences” Standard for Title VII and ADEA Liability, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 247, 257-58
(2007).
32. See Dey v. Colt. Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994) (An
employer may be liable if “an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual
information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”). For a
discussion of the many other circuits that have adopted lenient approaches, see Cat’s Paw
Liability,
http://www.uslaw.com/library/Law_Students/Circuit_Split_Cats_Paw_Liability.php?item=3
4000 (last visited March 25, 2009).
33. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 28, at 21.
34. Davis, supra note 31, at 249-51. But see Brief for Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 127 S.
Ct. 852 (2007), 2007 WL 647974 (arguing that Title VII’s definition of an “agent” in
subordinate supervisor cases includes only the formal decision maker, not the subordinate
supervisor because an “agent” is only a party that has the authority to act on behalf of the
employer).
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biased employees in some cases, and recognizing that the decision-makers
who are given official authority to take employment actions are not always
the individuals who solely make the decisions, encourages employers to be
more responsible when crafting policies and when hiring and overseeing
subordinate supervisors. 35 Additionally, it furthers the objectives of federal
anti-discrimination statutes by ensuring that employees are afforded
adequate remedies from employers that may attempt to shield themselves
from liability by having all personnel decisions made through centralized
committees or other removed decision-makers. 36
The Supreme Court has recognized subordinate bias liability based on
agency principles. 37 In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 38 the Court
considered a case in which a female bank employee brought a sexual
harassment suit against her supervisor and the bank. 39 Although the Court
declined to find employers automatically liable for any wrongdoing by
supervisors, 40 it did acknowledge that Congress intended for courts to look
to agency principles when deciding whether to impute liability to
employers for discriminatory or harassing supervisors. 41 The Court stated:
While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all
their particulars to Title VII, Congress’ decision to define
“employer” to include any “agent” of an employer . . . surely
evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees
for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. 42
The transfer of agency principles to employment discrimination was
reinforced again in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth. 43 The Court examined
agency principles when deciding whether an employer was vicariously
liable for a supervisor who sexually harassed an employee and made threats
Citing Section 219 of the
against the employee’s job security. 44
Restatement of Agency, 45 the Court acknowledged that “An employer may
35. Mary-Kathryn Zachary, Subordinate Bias Liability: Cat’s Paw, Rubber Stamp, and
Other Theories, SUPERVISION, 67(10), Oct. 1, 2006, at 22.
36. Id. at 23.
37. See Ali Razzaghi, Comment and Case Note, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Management, Inc.: “Substantially Influencing” the Fourth Circuit to Change Its Standard
for Imputing Employer Liability for the Biases of a Non-Decisionmaker, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
1709, 1713 (2005) (explaining that agency principles are used to determine whether a person
or entity is an agent or employer).
38. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
39. Id. at 60.
40. Id. at 72.
41. See id. (“[W]e do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to
agency principles for guidance in this area.”).
42. Id. (internal citations omitted).
43. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
44. Id. at 755.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (“A master is subject to
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be liable for both negligent and intentional torts committed by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment.” 46 Lower federal courts have
applied this principle based on this Supreme Court precedent. 47
The cat’s paw theory of employer liability supports the objectives 48
The federal anti-discrimination statutes that are most intertwined in
subordinate bias cases are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII), 49 the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 50 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 51 These statutes
were enacted to combat discrimination in the workplace, protect employees
most susceptible to discriminatory practices, and compensate employment
discrimination victims. 52
The statutory language of these three statutes articulates these
objectives very clearly. Title VII states that it is unlawful for any employer
to deprive an individual of employment based on “such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 53 Title VII’s goals are clear: “[T]o
eradicate employment discrimination and provide redress for victims of
such discrimination.” 54
Similarly, the ADA provides unambiguous
language of intent: No employer may discriminate “[A]gainst a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to . . . discharge of employees . . . .” 55 Lastly, the ADEA also offers
clear guidance on its objective: to make it illegal for an employer to
terminate an employee “because of such individual’s age.” 56
These statutes encourage employers to enact responsible policies that
prevent and identify discrimination. 57 However, the circuit split on
subordinate bias liability thus far has only left employers with uncertainty
as to how best to protect themselves against imputed liability for
discriminatory non-decision-makers. Employers can only enact responsible
policies if they are certain of the guidelines that apply to them, and of the
“depth of the investigation required to defeat potential subordinate bias in
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.”).
46. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756.
47. Razzaghi, supra note 37, at 1715-16.
48. Davis, supra note 31, at 249.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (2000).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (2000).
52. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (discussing the
objective of federal anti-discrimination statutes).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
54. Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination By Managers and Supervisors:
Recognized Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 580 (1994).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
57. Goldberg, supra note 54, at 577.
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‘cat’s paw’ claims.” 58
III. A “CAUSAL CONNECTION” STANDARD IS THE MOST BALANCED
APPROACH TO THE SUBORDINATE BIAS IMPUTATION PROBLEM
CONFRONTING EMPLOYERS
A.

Benefits Of a “Causal Connection” Standard

A “causal connection” standard that closely tracks the standard
announced in the Tenth Circuit’s BCI ruling is the most appropriate
approach because it conforms to the established anti-discrimination
statutory framework and corresponds with the Supreme Court’s prior
employment discrimination decisions.
Additionally, the “causal
connection” standard serves the practical realities of the expanding modern
workplace, where actual decision-makers are increasingly more likely to
use combinations of their own business judgment and recommendations
and evaluations from other subordinates to make employment decisions
regarding employees whom they do not know well.
Because the cat’s paw theory of liability is a commonly invoked
theory in this sub-category of disparate treatment cases, 59 a uniform
standard should be aligned most closely with other disparate treatment
standards. In order to make a case for disparate treatment under Title VII,
the ADEA or the ADA, an employee has to demonstrate that the adverse
employment action was “because of” the plaintiff’s membership in a
protected class. 60 Legal scholars have long argued that the “because of”
language requiring discriminatory intent should be accepted as a causal
connection standard. 61 These scholars point not only to the “because of”
language articulated in the statutes, but also to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the language as applied to disparate treatment cases
58. Genova, supra note 28.
59. Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision-Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 511
(2001).
60. Title VII’s protected categories are “race, color, religion sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(1)(2000). The ADEA protects a class of employees over the age of 40.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (2000). The ADA covers employees with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§
120101-12213 (2000).
61. See White & Krieger, supra note 59, at 503 (citing Paul A. Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Motivation, 1971 SUP. CT.
REV. 95, 115-24); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1991);
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1247 (1995); Michael
Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO.
L. J. 279, 288-291 (1997)).

832

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:3

brought under federal anti-discrimination statutes. 62
The causal connection standard is also favorable because it allows an
employer to break the causal relationship between the biased subordinate
and the adverse employment action if an “independent investigation of the
facts” is conducted. 63 This provision affords employers that adopt
responsible policies and conduct thorough investigations much deserved
protection. It also acknowledges the practical realities that large employers
face as human resources departments become more centralized. A decision
maker, such as a human resources representative, who works in a
centralized department is unlikely to know an employee who may be at the
center of an adverse employment action.
These decision-makers
necessarily rely on evaluations provided by supervisors and complaints
filed by co-workers. Without this “independent investigation” provision,
employers would be vulnerable to imputed liability because of
organizational structures that often rely on subordinate recommendations
and evaluations for crucial personnel decisions. The “causal connection”
approach, however, allows for an employer to escape liability if the
employer conducts a reasonable, good faith independent investigation. 64 In
these circumstances, the standard would reward careful employers that
implement procedural mechanisms to weed out discriminatory influence on
employment actions, but would still protect employees’ rights by allowing
causes of actions against irresponsible employers that do not take the
necessary steps to break the causal chain in an investigation.
If the “causal connection” test were to be adopted uniformly, it would
also fairly address at least two otherwise tricky situations. First, the causal
connection standard would provide guidance when an allegation or
complaint is made against an employee for discriminatory reasons, but

62. See White & Krieger, supra note 59, at 503 (“[T]he ‘because of’ test corresponds to
the statutory language used in Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA [and] . . . the Supreme
Court’s disparate treatment decisions, properly construed, would view the motive or intent
inquiry . . . as a search for causation.”). The authors discuss a series of opinions supporting
the view that some degree of causation is necessary in disparate treatment cases. E.g., Pers.
Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”);
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (arguing that plaintiff
must show that action was motivated by discriminatory conduct); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (concluding that the claim turns on whether the real reason
for employer’s actions was racial discrimination); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 244-45 (1989) (discussing the balance of burdens once gender is shown to be a
motivating factor).
63. BCI, 450 F.3d at 485 (10th Cir. 2006).
64. Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing the impact of
an independent investigation as compared to simply accepting the recommendations of
supervisory employees).
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upon the independent, nondiscriminatory investigation, legitimate
misconduct is confirmed and the employer has valid grounds for an adverse
employment action. 65 Under this scenario, the causal connection test
would not impose liability on the employer because the adverse
employment action would be the result of actual misconduct discovered
through an investigation by a decision maker without discriminatory bias.
Second, the causal connection standard is broad enough in scope to
extend to situations in which the biased subordinate is any other employee,
not just a supervisor, who may impact an employment action. 66
Broadening the standard announced in BCI to address this situation makes
sense from a statutory perspective, as it is in line with the goal of
eliminating disparate treatment for discriminatory reasons. 67 It also makes
sense from a practical perspective. There should not be a difference
between non-supervising employees and supervisors if both groups are able
to lodge complaints, make false allegations, or otherwise unfairly
undermine another party’s employment status because of a discriminatory
motive. 68 If adopted uniformly, a “causal connection” standard would
allow room for the inclusion of a broad range of workplace actors and
further anti-discrimination objectives. 69
B.

Areas for Improvement

Several questions remain open regarding a “causal connection”
standard for subordinate bias liability. First, it is unclear what level of
influence a subordinate must actually have to be said to “cause” an adverse
employment action. 70 In disparate treatment cases that turn on whether the
65. This situation is similar to the factual scenario in Kendrick v. Penske Transp.
Services, Inc., 220 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). In Kendrick, the court did not impute
liability to the employer because the investigation unearthed a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason to terminate the employee, and the employee declined the decision maker’s request
to give his version of events. Id. at 1231-32 (concluding that the court must consider the
facts as they appeared to the decision-maker at the time of deciding to take adverse
employment action).
66. Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Male Employee Disciplined for Sexual Harassment as Sex
Discrimination Plaintiff, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 717, 748 (2000) (detailing a scenario whereby
the discriminatory animus of a supervisory employee would be attributed to the employer,
even where another manager makes the decision to terminate).
67. See supra Part II (discussing liability imputed to the employer).
68. Lidge, supra note 66, at 749 (describing hypothetical situations whereby rank and
file employees lodge complaints with a discriminatory animus).
69. The Tenth Circuit causation test does include imputed liability for employees on the
same level of employment as the employee bringing suit. See Young v. Dillon Companies,
Inc., 468 F.3d 1243 (2006) (imputing liability to an employer for a worker who reported a
co-worker on the same employment level to human resources with a discriminatory intent).
70. See White & Krieger, supra note 59, at 514 (describing the focus on causation in
vertical decision making cases involving a subordinate and a higher level supervisor).
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actual decision maker was motivated by discriminatory bias to take an
adverse employment action, the employee alleging the discrimination must
demonstrate that the decision maker is motivated to discriminate against
the employee due to membership in a protected class. 71 However, it is not
clear under the cat’s paw theory that plaintiffs alleging employment
discrimination must show the immediate supervisor or co-worker acted
with conscious discriminatory animus. Are subordinates and actual
decision makers held to different standards for purposes of employment
discrimination claims? This remains unclear and should be resolved in
favor of one standard for both groups to maintain a consistent approach to
disparate treatment claims under a cat’s paw theory.
Additionally, the question of whether liability can be imputed to an
employer when a biased non-employee third party, such as an independent
contractor or client, has undermined an employee’s status with
discriminatory intent remains open. 72 The causal connection standard (or
any approach under the cat’s paw theory for that matter), has yet to be
applied in a case where an employee is alleging that a non-employee
caused an adverse employment action due to discriminatory animus.
Because the cat’s paw doctrine is at least partly grounded in principles of
agency and non-employees are not under the scope of federal antidiscrimination laws, it would be difficult to impute liability to an employer,
even if a discriminatory non-employee had substantial influence over the
adverse employment action. 73 However, this significantly narrows the
protection afforded to employees by the cat’s paw theory. In order for the
causal connection standard to be consistent then, this tension needs to be
resolved in favor of employee protection in circumstances where there is a
causal connection between the biased individual’s discriminatory animus
for a protected employee and an adverse employment action against the
employee. 74

71. Id. at 514-15 (discussing biases the court will consider in relation to negative
employment decisions by supervisors).
72. See Davis, supra note 31, at 258. The author identified this issue in relation to the
Seventh Circuit’s broader “any influence” test because the circuit has only addressed a
subordinate bias case in the context of a biased supervisor. However, it is an open issue
under the “causal connection” standard as well.
73. Id. at 258 (describing agency principles for purposes of imputing liability to the
employer).
74. Id. at 259-63. The author introduces a “substantial influence” standard and argues
that under this approach, an employer may be held liable, consistent with agency principles,
for an adverse employment action if a non-employee makes a discriminatory report that
leads to action. Id. The argument is that any employee tasked with investigating complaints
or accusations of wrongdoing by an employee is acting within the scope of employment,
and therefore, such employees are obligated by their duty of “care, competence, and
diligence” owed to the employer to investigate all allegations, regardless of source. Id.
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IV. THE NEED FOR A DEFINITIVE APPROACH TO INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATION
All three approaches articulated by the current circuit split do have
one commonality: the concept of independent investigation. Whatever
uniform approach is eventually adopted for subordinate bias liability, this
“independent investigation” standard will need to be significantly
developed. Previous cases have suggested that it is an employer’s only
way of breaking the causal connection between a subordinate’s
discriminatory animus and the ultimate decision maker’s employment
action. 75 As such, it is imperative that employers know how far they are
obligated to probe for an investigation to be considered sufficiently
“independent” for purposes of avoiding liability.
The current ambiguities surrounding what an independent
investigation is create a burden for large and small employers alike,
irrespective of their resources. For instance, a large employer with
significant resources at its disposal may have a large, centralized human
resources department that handles all employment matters and takes
adverse actions. 76 In a large, centralized department, it is unlikely that the
actual decision maker will know the employee involved in an adverse
employment action. An employer with this type of personnel department
needs some guidance as to what it needs to do to ensure that a biased
subordinate supervisor’s influence on an employment action does not fall
through the cracks of an investigation. In contrast, a smaller employer with
fewer resources needs to know how much time and money must be put into
an investigation. While it may be less difficult to investigate a biased
supervisor or alleged employee misconduct or violations in a smaller
operation, resources may be more scarce, making outside counsel and/or
internal manpower to complete a thorough investigation cost-prohibitive.
Several circuits have discussed the concept of independent
investigation, 77 but the approaches of these circuits have not formulated a
clear definition. The varying statements describing what an independent
investigation may look like only add to the confusion and uncertainty that
surrounds subordinate bias liability as a whole. Currently, it is unclear to
employers how to best prepare and protect themselves through independent
investigations from liability stemming from the actions of biased non-

75. See, e.g., Shager, 913 F.2d at 406 (concluding that an independent decision by the
employer’s career committee would have prevented a finding of a willful or innocent
violation of the Act).
76. Id. at 405 (describing the role of the centralized career committee as the ultimate
decision maker).
77. See supra Parts I, III (discussing outcomes in various circuits).
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decision makers. 78 A coherent framework needs to be constructed that
defines the parameters of what type of investigation is sufficiently
“independent” to absolve an employer of liability for a discriminatory
subordinate.
The courts that have adopted “any influence” and “causal connection”
standards to impute subordinate bias to an employer have articulated some
elements of the independent investigation requirement that should be
included in a uniform formulation. First, the Seventh Circuit announced
some hallmarks of independence in Shager. 79 The Shager Court stated that
a thorough, independent investigation must amount to more than a mere
“rubber stamp” on the biased subordinate supervisor’s recommendation or
complaint; 80 that is, the actual decision maker cannot accept the
recommendations or allegations of a subordinate non-decision maker at
face value.
The Seventh Circuit, in Brewer v. Board of Trustees of University of
Illinois, 81 also noted that a decision maker cannot limit the investigation to
only information received from an employee who may be biased, and must
have some other procedural safeguards 82 or unbiased documentation to
An independent
support the independence of an investigation. 83
investigation is marked by “some affirmative act by the decision maker to
come to his own decision.” 84 In Brewer, an African-American student who
worked at a university was fired from his parking services job because his
supervisor failed to tell his boss that the student was given permission to
park in a reserved parking space. 85 The student alleged that his supervisor
kept silent because of her racially discriminatory views towards him, which
led to his termination. 86 The court upheld summary judgment for the
employer because the facts demonstrated that the decision maker conducted
her own investigation to determine whether the student’s parking permit
had been altered and if he had been parking illegally. 87 “[W]here a
decision maker is not wholly dependent on a single source of information,
but instead conducts its own investigation into the facts relevant to the

78. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 28, at 25.
79. See 913 F.2d at 406 (describing failures of the employers decision committee).
80. Id.
81. 479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007).
82. See also Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a three-day hearing to investigate an allegation of employee misconduct was
an independent investigation absolving the employer of liability for a biased subordinate).
83. See id.
84. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 28, at 25.
85. 479 F.3d at 909-10.
86. Id. at 909.
87. Id. at 919-21 (upholding summary judgment on claim since decision maker did not
simply rely upon information supplied to her).
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decision, the employer is not liable for an employee’s submission of
misinformation to the decision maker.” 88
Other courts have offered suggestions regarding how much
independent information has to be involved in an adverse employment
action to break the causal link. An investigation should not only rely on
other sources besides a biased subordinate, but decision makers should also
speak with the affected employees directly, try to ascertain their points of
view, and assess the situation from as many perspectives as possible. In
BCI, the Tenth Circuit began to define independent investigation by stating
that a review of a personnel file by the decision maker is not enough, as
articulated by the other cases discussed above. 89 Instead, the court went on
to suggest that an independent investigation can amount to “hear[ing] both
sides of the story before taking an adverse employment action against a
member of a protected class,” 90 and can be as cursory as “‘in the course of
[the] investigation’ the decision maker asked the employee ‘to give his
version of the exchange.’” 91 The Ninth Circuit cited the BCI standard in
Poland v. Chertoff, 92 noting that for an independent investigation to be
legally permissible and assist the employer in escaping liability, the biased
subordinate cannot have influenced, affected, or been involved in the
investigation in any way. 93
Similar to the principle of conducting a fair investigation by gathering
as much independent evidence from the involved parties that was
articulated in BCI, the Fifth Circuit held in Long v. Eastfield College, 94 that
an employer is liable for subordinate bias if the final decision maker bases
his or her adverse employment action on the recommendation of the
discriminatory supervisor, instead of conducting an investigation
independently that considers all parties’ perspectives and finds additional
evidence to confirm or refute the biased supervisor’s claims. 95 In this case,
two female employees sued a university for their terminations, alleging
gender and national origin discrimination and retaliation. 96 The president
of the university made the decision to fire both employees, although he was
not the party the employees claimed harbored discriminatory animus. 97
The court reversed the summary judgment grant on the unlawful retaliation
88. Id. at 918.
89. BCI, 450 F.3d at 492-93 (holding that examining personnel file without any
additional action does not suffice as an independent investigation by the decision maker).
90. Id. at 488.
91. Id. at 485.
92. 494 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2007).
93. Id. at 1183.
94. 88 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 1996).
95. Id. at 307.
96. Id. at 303-04.
97. Id. at 308.
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claim, and discussed how different factual findings would determine the
independence of the investigation taken. 98 The president’s letters stating
that his decision was based on the recommendation of the employees’
supervisors went in favor of “rubber stamping” the biased subordinates’
decisions, while the written statements requested from all parties to
consider the different perspectives favored the finding of an independent
investigation. 99
Speaking with the affected employee directly or examining statements
made by the employee about the situation and in the process uncovering
additional, independent evidence of a valid violation seems to be a strong
indication that an investigation has considered the situation independent of
any discriminatory bias. 100 In Smith v. Chrysler Corp., an employee with
narcolepsy alleged a discriminatory termination but did not prevail because
the employee’s supervisor reasonably relied on documentation from the
employee’s physicians and statements made by the employee himself that
indicated he lied on his employment application. 101 Even if a supervisor’s
judgments are initially based on discriminatory views, the Sixth Circuit in
this case suggested that independent evidence validating the claims is
enough for the employer to escape liability. 102
A few cohesive characteristics stand out from these piecemeal
descriptions of an investigation standard that may guide a future uniform
standard and help employers develop investigation policies and avoid
litigation:
(1) an investigation must be based on more than
recommendations or allegations by subordinate supervisors; (2) an
investigation must consist of more than reviewing a personnel file because
of the risk that the contents may be tainted by subordinate supervisors; (3)
an investigation must include asking affected parties for their versions of
the story and documenting these statements; (4) an investigation must be
conducted independent of a subordinate supervisor’s involvement; and (5)
procedural safeguards must be in place to protect against an investigator
becoming tainted, such as an investigation that obtains the perspectives of
multiple parties and uncovers actual evidence of the affected employee’s
wrongdoing. 103
There are some issues to consider under an investigation standard that
bears the characteristics described above. First, who should conduct the
investigation: someone involved in the organization, or an outsider? If an

98. Id.
99. Id. at 307, n.8.
100. See Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998); Ware v. Unified Sch.
Dist. No.492, 902 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. Smith, 155 F.3d at 807-09.
102. Id. at 808-09.
103. See discussion supra Part II.
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investigation is conducted by an “insider,” such as a human resources
representative or in-house legal counsel there are many considerations if
that party is also the individual who fielded the initial evaluations,
complaints, or other communications that triggered the adverse
employment action. For instance, one criticism of the BCI standard of
independent investigation is that it does not take into account that the
“factual misinformation” 104 provided by a biased subordinate may taint the
actual decision maker, even if this person was originally unbiased and
approached the situation with independent judgment. 105 This tendency is
referred to as “expectancy confirmation bias.” 106 This bias is often
formulated when a recommendation has been made by another individual
to the decision maker that functions as what the decision maker expects to
find, even if conducting his or her own investigation. 107 The vague
investigatory standards that have been formulated by the circuits thus far
have not accounted for these cognitive issues.
This “cognitive phenomenon” 108 also highlights other potential issues
that arise when a company decision maker is making a personnel decision.
A decision maker may consciously search for wrongdoing on the part of
the affected employee by giving deference to the biased party’s superior
position in the organization or the party’s relationship to the
organization, 109 investigating the claim in a way that focuses on uncovering
other instances of employee conduct that confirm the original complaint, 110
and processing the information uncovered in a way that looks favorably on
confirming evidence and unfavorably on contradicting evidence of the
employee’s conduct. 111
A uniform investigation standard should account for these cognitive
issues. These biases that may permeate a decision maker’s investigation
may be counteracted by also establishing mandatory procedures to check
into the background, motives, behavior, and other circumstances
surrounding the individual recommending the adverse employment
action. 112 Furthermore, investigations that involve interviewing neutral
104. Comment, Employment Law—Title VII—Tenth Circuit Clarifies Causation
Standard for Subordinate Bias Claims, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1703 (2007).
105. Id.
106. White & Krieger, supra note 59 at 524.
107. Id.
108. Employment Law—Title VII—Tenth Circuit Clarifies Causation Standard for
Subordinate Bias Claims supra note 104, at 1700. The Comment suggests that
psychological research supports a theory that decision makers will subconsciously recreate
the findings of biased supervisors, ending in a decision that mirrors the discriminatory
animus and undercuts any marks of independence.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1704.
111. Id. at 1704-05.
112. Id. at 1705-06.
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employees not otherwise involved in the employment matter and looking
into how similar employment matters have been handled by the employer
previously would further preserve the independence of the investigation.
The lack of objectivity risked by using an in-house party to undertake
an investigation and make a decision is counterbalanced by the risks of
using an outsider. An independent consultant or external legal counsel may
have more expertise in investigations, be more experienced in conducting
interviewing employees and examining evidence, and be more likely to
approach the investigation from an impartial perspective. 113 However,
outsiders may also be less familiar with the organizational structure of an
employer, the parties involved in the employment matter, how similar
situations had been handled previously, and the employer’s workplace
culture. 114 Additionally, the cost of hiring external parties to conduct
investigations could be prohibitively expensive. 115
Therefore, who conducts a sufficiently “independent” investigation
will depend on factors that include the severity of the allegation, the
credibility issues of the employer and involved employees, cost, and ability
to utilize objective parties in an investigation. 116
Additionally, the flexibility of a standard that adopts the described
characteristics is a consideration. A uniform investigation standard should
be flexible enough to provide employers with discretion to make their own
business decisions. Actual decision makers, such as human resources
personnel, are specially trained and experienced in making tough
employment decisions. An independent investigation standard should not
be so stringent that it interferes with decision makers from tailoring
investigations to particular circumstances, based on their experience and
judgment. Courts have long recognized that employers should have the
authority to make their own decisions without excessive restrictions or
Therefore, in formulating a coherent
judicial second-guessing. 117
independent investigation standard, the courts should be concerned with
113. John Montoya, Who Should Investigate Sexual Harassment Complaints?, 43
HRMAGAZINE, Jan. 1998, at 113.
114. Id.
115. Id. The author also warns of the risk that employing counsel to both investigate an
employment matter and provide legal advice may risk the waiver of attorney-client
privilege. See, e.g., Stoner v. New York Ballet Co., 90 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) No. 597
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2002) (permitting the plaintiff to depose the employer’s legal counsel in
an employment discrimination matter because the attorney also conducted the investigation
surrounding the employment action).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Stallings v. Hussman Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting
that a court’s responsibility in ruling on disparate treatment matters is only to interfere if
there is evidence of intentional discrimination, not to “sit as super-personnel departments
reviewing the wisdom and fairness of the business judgments made by employers”) (internal
quotations omitted).
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balancing the prevention and remedying of employment discrimination
with the employer’s interest in autonomous and discretionary decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
The “cat’s paw theory” of subordinate bias liability has resulted in
three inconsistent approaches to this subset of disparate treatment
employment discrimination and created uncertainty for employers seeking
to adhere to anti-discrimination legislation and protect themselves from
liability. The overarching goals of the federal anti-discrimination statutory
frameworks—to encourage responsible employer policies 118 and hold
employers accountable for their actions 119 —can only be achieved if
employers have an incentive for putting such policies in place. Without a
uniform standard that articulates employer responsibilities, some employers
are vulnerable to liability exposure for virtually any biased subordinate’s
actions that relate to adverse employment decisions, while other less
responsible employers have unfettered protection from liability as long as
they filter their adverse employment actions through centralized
committees or human resources departments. This uncertainty creates
unreasonable and costly burdens for employees while simultaneously
undermining employee protections and rights.
When the Supreme Court granted the parties’ request to dismiss
certiorari in BCI and later declined to hear two similar cases, it punted the
question of what approach is appropriate back to the circuits. Because this
issue is vital to both employers and employees, the Supreme Court should
accept a cat’s paw case and adopt a uniform approach that resolves the
current Circuit split. The “causal connection” standard adopted by the
Tenth Circuit in BCI is the closest to a favorable approach because it
furthers anti-discrimination objectives and strikes a balance between
employer and employee interests. The standard is stringent enough to
protect employers because it does not allow for a “a lenient ‘may have
affected’ standard that punishes employers for any ‘input’—no matter how
minor—to weaken the deterrent effect of subordinate bias claims by
imposing liability even where an employer has diligently conducted an
independent investigation.” 120 Such a standard will also allow courts to
enforce anti-discrimination laws without sitting as super-personnel
departments, second-guessing the personnel decisions of an employer,121 by
still holding employers accountable for “rubber-stamping” subordinate
118.
119.
120.
121.

Subordinate Bias Liability, supra note 35, at 22.
BCI, 450 F.3d at 486.
Id. at 487.
Stallings, 447 F.3d at 1052.
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decisions or for conducting investigations that are not sufficiently
independent from a biased subordinate’s recommendations or allegations.
Whatever uniform approach to subordinate bias liability is eventually
formulated, the parameters of what constitutes an independent investigation
must be defined.
Several circuits have discussed independent
investigations; while none form a complete definition on their own, taken
together, a clear and consistent standard can be formulated. It is imperative
that the Supreme Court hears a subordinate bias liability case to answer
these unresolved questions.
If the Supreme Court ultimately articulates a uniform test, it should
balance an employer’s interest in making autonomous and reasonable
personnel decisions without fear that every termination will be grounds for
a suit, with an employee’s interest in protection against an employer who
allows biased supervisors to affect a personnel decision without
repercussions.
The judicial system should enforce and encourage
responsible employer practices that underscore the objectives of federal
anti-discrimination statutes. It should also be wary of substituting its own
judgment for that of the employers’, so that judicial overreaching and
second-guessing do not undermine the deterrent effect of legislative
enactments and otherwise undermine antidiscrimination goals.

